Unemployment Insurance Benefit Levels and Consumption Changes. by Martin Browning & Thomas Crossley
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
Australian National University
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFIT LEVELS
AND CONSUMPTION CHANGES
Martin Browning and Thomas F. Crossley*
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 405
August 1999
ISSN: 1442-8636
ISBN: 0 7315 2269 9
* Martin Browning, Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen;
Thomas F. Crossley, Department of Economics, York University, Toronto,
and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University.
We are grateful to Roger Gordon, two anonymous referees and participants
in the TAPES Conference, Copenhagen, 1998, for their comments as well as
to Thierry Magnac and participants at several seminars for comments on an
earlier (1996) version of this paper employing only the 1993 COEP.
We acknowledge financial support from the Social Science and Humanities
Research Council of Canada. The data used in this study were made
available by Human Resources Development Canada. The latter bears no










Table 1: Regression Analysis of Benefit Effect 27
Table 2: Regressions - Robustness Checks 28
Appendix A 29ABSTRACT
We use a Canadian survey of the unemployed to examine how household
expenditures after a job loss respond to the level of income replacement provided by
UI. We isolate a liquidity constraint or 'transitory income' effect from the 'permanent
income' shock of job loss, and from the costs of working. We find significant effects
of varying the replacement ratio among the third of the sample who did not have
assets at the job loss. We conclude that the consumption smoothing benefit of UI is
concentrated wholly on a sub-group of the unemployed.
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Constraints.
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1. Introduction
Should governments provide unemployment insurance and, if so, what should the provisions
be? There have been numerous studies of the costs of unemployment insurance (UI) in recent
years but fewer attempts to measure the benefits.  Households may benefit from UI in several
ways:
(1) Liquidity constrained households that have temporarily low income will not be able to
set their current consumption at a level consistent with their expectations of the future.
For such households the transitory replacement income provided by UI has a benefit
that depends on inter-temporal substitution elasticities: the more averse households
are to fluctuations in consumption the greater is the gain from UI income. This is
often thought to be the most important benefit from UI.
1  For convenience, we refer to
this as the ‘consumption smoothing’ benefit.
(2)  If households can equate current and expected discounted future marginal utility of
money, but are self insuring and have a utility function with a positive third derivative
then they will hold precautionary savings (Baily (1978)).  Risk pooling across
individuals will reduce precautionary savings and result in a second order welfare
gain. We refer to this as the ‘risk pooling’ benefit of UI.
(3)  Even if households have access to credit markets and quadratic utility (so that there is
no precautionary saving), there is a gain from social insurance that flows simply from
the fact that households with concave utility functions will be averse to risky income
streams. This is a pure insurance effect, and we refer to it as the ‘insurance benefit’ of
UI to distinguish it from the ‘consumption smoothing’ and ‘risk pooling’ benefits
defined above. By reducing the variance of stochastic outcomes, UI provides
insurance against unrealized shocks to permanent income. A similar effect of
progressive taxes is discussed by Varian (1980).  In an infinite horizon model, this
benefit disappears because the transitory fluctuations which UI dampens have
negligible permanent income effects. However, in a finite horizon model, each within
period realization has a finite effect on expected lifetime income (see Bailey (1978)
and Flemming (1978)). Of course these effects will be larger (and hence the benefit of
UI greater) if the number of periods is small or if the income process has some
persistence.
                                                          
1 For example, Gruber(1997) writes that “The primary benefit of UI is the ability of government to smooth consumption
during unemployment spells.”2
It is the potential ‘consumption smoothing’ benefit of UI which is the focus of this
paper.
2  We use a new Canadian panel data set to examine household expenditure changes
across a job loss and how those changes vary with the level of replacement income provided
by UI.  Household expenditure changes with unemployment confound three things: the costs
of working (changes in expenditure due to the non-separability of consumption from labor
supply), a response to the ‘permanent income’ shock of job loss, and, a response to ‘transitory
income’.  Responses to transitory income are informative about the ‘consumption smoothing’
benefit of UI.  Specifically, if households respond to marginal changes in ‘transitory income’
then they are not on their optimal consumption path, and marginal actuarially fair increases in
UI replacement income (that increase current income and lower future income) raise
household welfare, moving the household towards that optimal path.
The form of our test will be to see if differences in the UI replacement ratio across a
sample of households experiencing unemployment correlate with differences in the reported
expenditure change from before the beginning of the unemployment spell. There is no
variation in labor force status across our sample, so our test is not confounded by non-
separability between consumption and labor supply. Consequently, to isolate a ‘transitory
response’ the main econometric problem we have is that across our sample the UI
replacement ratio is plausibly correlated with the permanent shock from a job loss. To
overcome this we use rich controls for the permanent shock. We can also test that we have
‘purged’ the UI benefit of its ‘permanent’ component by performing an exogeneity test using
instruments that are based on the “quasi-experiment” afforded by two sets of legislative
changes (and one administrative change) to the Canadian UI system over our sample period.
These instruments are correlated with the temporary loss of income but not with the
permanent shock of job loss.
Of the small literature on the benefits of UI, this paper is most similar to Gruber
(1997).  Our work differs from Gruber’s in several important ways: we use a different
measure of expenditure (total, rather than food), a different source of variation in benefits
                                                          
2  In addition to the benefits outlined above, unemployment insurance may also play a redistributive role or the role of an
automatic macroeconomic  stabilizer.3
(specific legislative changes rather than state-time variation) and of course a different country
(Canada rather than the U.S.) which differs in the parameters of its UI system and in other
aspects of its social safety net.  In addition, our data are rich enough to allow us to focus
attention on particular subsets of households which are likely to be liquidity constrained.
Since responses to “transitory income” should only be observed among the liquidity
constrained, this focus improves our chance of finding indications of large ‘consumption
smoothing’ benefits.
An outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we derive our estimating
equation from a structural model of inter-temporal utility maximization. The presence of a
structural model makes explicit the potential sources of gains from UI. Additionally, the
structural model allows us to state explicitly and clearly the conditions that allow us to
identify the ‘benefit effect’; that is, the impact of marginal changes in the replacement rate on
total expenditure. In Section 3 we introduce the data, the Canadian UI system and the
legislative and administrative changes that the data capture.
Section 4 presents our empirical results. Our principal finding is that differences in the
replacement ratio have small mean effects on household total expenditures. For example, a 10
percentage point cut in benefit levels (from 60% to 50% replacement, for example) would
lead to an average fall of only 0.8% in total expenditure. This mean effect is somewhat
smaller than those reported by Gruber (1997). Although the mean effect is small we show that
it is concentrated among a small number of households and that most households would not
react to a change in the UI replacement rate. The strongest effect is for households that did
not have liquid assets at the job separation; this is consistent with the presence of liquidity
constraints. We also find a significant effect for respondents who were married but whose
spouse was not employed; this suggests that the presence of a second income facilitates
consumption smoothing (although we do not find any significant effect for singles). In section
5, we discuss possible reasons for the difference between our results and those of Gruber
(1997) and summarise what we think are the important implications of our results for policy
analysis. In particular, we emphasise that the fact that benefit effects are heterogenous
invalidates most analysis which effectively assumes a representative agent.4
2. Theory
In this section we develop a structural model of inter-temporal utility maximization which
allows us to interpret our empirical results in terms of the welfare gains (or losses) from UI.
The derivation of the model also clarifies what is required for the parameters of interest to be
identified. If benefits were randomly assigned then we could identify the benefit effect simply
by looking at how expenditures changes vary with benefit levels. However, benefits are not
randomly assigned and cross sectional variation in benefits is correlated with other
determinants of expenditures, which we must control for.  Furthermore, we will argue below
that the cross sectional variation in benefits among our sample of job losers is also correlated
with determinants of the change in expenditures, so the fact that we first difference the data
does not obviate the need for controls.
To illustrate the biases that would arise from just regressing consumption changes on
the replacement rate, consider two variables: 'earnings on the lost job' and the agent's
'attachment to the labor force'. For the former, it is plausible that high earners experience a
larger shock with job loss and have a lower replacement rate (details will be given below).
Thus the correlation between consumption changes and the replacement rate partially reflects
this effect. The bias from 'attachment to the labor force' has the opposite sign since
attachment is negatively correlated with the replacement rate but positively correlated with
the job loss shock since 'low attachment' workers do not experience much of a negative job
shock loss. These two examples also illustrate that there may be a  bias from ignoring
permanent variables and that this bias can be positive or negative.
We begin by considering changes in expenditure around a job separation for an agent
who lives alone. We consider a discrete period, single non-durable good model in which new
information is only revealed at the end of each period. Consumption in any period takes place
before the end of period information is known but after the current period income is revealed.
We are considering an agent who suffers a job loss, so let period t be the period before the job
separation and period t+1 the period after; thus the job separation takes place at the end of
period t and may not be fully anticipated in period t.5
Let t  be the marginal utility of expenditure in period t; the condition for optimal
intertemporal allocation between t and t+1 gives that
 t+1 = t  - ut+1   (1)
where ut+1 is a 'surprise' error term
3  which is orthogonal to the information set in time t; it
includes the shock from the job loss (and hence is likely to be negative) as well as any other
new information that arrives at the end of period t. Thus:
E( ut+1 | I t ) =0  (2)
(where It is the information available at time t). However, our sample below takes only those
who experienced a job loss. If this separation is partially unexpected (with respect to the
information set at time t) then we have that the expectation of ut+1 conditional on It and a
separation occurring between t and t+1 is negative and may be correlated with past
information.
To formalize this, let the realized shock be L+ t+1 if the agent loses their job
between periods t and t+1 and E+ t+1 otherwise. Thus L represents the 'permanent' shock
(the revision to the marginal utility of expenditure) from a job loss. The residual term  t+1
captures all of the impact of news except for that concerning any job loss. Thus E(  t+1 | I t)
=0. If %t is the probability of a job loss between t and t+1, given the information available at
time t, then the latter equation and equation (2) give %tL+(1-%t)E =0. This relationship has
a number of implications. First, both of the 'job' shocks are zero if there is no uncertainty
concerning the job loss (that is, %t=0 or 1). Second, the two shocks have opposite signs if
there is some uncertainty (presumably, L  is negative). Third, the less expected the job
separation is, the greater the negative shock associated with a job loss with respect to the
shock of keeping the job. Finally, we have the revised version of equation (3):
E( ut+1 | I t, Job Loss) =L     (3)
This captures the important feature of our stochastic specification which is that the Euler
equation shock for a selected sample is not necessarily uncorrelated with past information.
                                                          
3 The Euler equation is written with a 'minus' in front of the surprise term so that negative shocks lead to a rise in the
marginal utility of expenditure.6
There are two sets of correlates for L . First we have variables that reflect the
permanent shock from the job loss; denote these Zt where the t subscript emphasizes that
these variables are known at time t (and some may even be permanent). Examples include the
occupation in the lost job, earnings and tenure on that job, the race, age and family situation
of the agent and local labour market conditions.
The second set of correlates with L  arise from the possibility of the agent being
liquidity constrained. If this is the case then the job loss has a negative impact over and above
the permanent shock. More importantly for the purposes at hand, in this case the UI benefit
level will enter directly into the determination of L  and hence into the level of consumption
in period t+1. Denote any UI benefit received by the agent as Bt+1 and pre-separation earnings
as Yt and define the 'replacement ratio' as at+1=(Bt+1/Yt). As well as the replacement ratio, the
level of assets that the agent carries forward from period t to period t+1 will also affect the
level of the liquidity constraint Lagrange multiplier, which we denote µ. Denoting asset levels
at the beginning of period t+1 by At+1 we have:
L  = f(Zt, µ(At+1,at+1)) (4)
The non-negative constraint function µ( .)  is non-increasing in At+1 since higher assets at the
beginning of the period reduce the probability of being constrained. It is also non-increasing
in at+1 since if at+1 is close to zero then the constraint is likely to be binding but as at+1 rises,
at some point the constraint no longer binds and µ  is zero for all higher values of at+1. We
term the relationship between total expenditure and the replacement rate, conditional on
permanent variables, the 'benefit effect'. This reflects the impact of transitory changes in
income on expenditure.
The job loss function  f(Zt, µ(At+1,at+1)) in equation (4) is decreasing in µ; this reflects
that liquidity constraints make bad shocks even worse. Thus, if the agent is constrained, then
increasing the benefit level (and hence the replacement rate) makes the job loss shock less
negative. Combining (1), ut+1 = L+ t+1 and (4) we have the revised Euler equation:
 t+1 = -f(Zt, µ(At+1,at+1)) -  t+1 (5)
If we parameterize preferences (that is, define   in terms of consumption) and  the functions
f( .)  and µ( .)  then this gives us an equation for consumption changes that can be estimated7
from the data. Note that this implicitly invokes the usual Euler equation orthogonality
conditions. One major concern in doing this is that we have only two periods. The
'Chamberlain critique' points out that the Euler equation orthogonality conditions apply across
time and not across agents which invalidates the use of short panels if there are common
macro shocks which impact differently on different agents (see Chamberlain (1984) and
Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a recent discussion). Here, however, we are conditioning on
past levels of Z, so that we only need to invoke the much weaker assumption that, conditional
on the Z variables, any common macro shock has the same effect on all agents.
Effectively, then, we identify the benefit effect by assuming that the replacement rate
is uncorrelated with the error term in equation (5) . Even though this is much weaker than
assuming that it is uncorrelated with the permanent shock, it is still important to be able to
test for the validity of this assumption. To do this involves testing for the exogeneity of the
liquidity constraint variables once we have conditioned on the permanent shock variables Zt .
For this we need variables that affect the replacement rate but not the permanent shock; that is
instruments for the replacement rate. Since our instruments depend on changes to the
Canadian UI system, we leave the details for the empirical section but we emphasize here that
we do test the identifying assumption.
Denoting consumption in period t as Ct  we take the following (Frisch or  -constant)
equation for log consumption in period t:
ln Ct  =  + t  - t  (6)
where  is a constant 'bliss' level (which we shall shortly 'difference away') such that  >
max(ln C), the variable t captures the effects of the discounted price level, demographics and
discount factors.
4With the parameter restrictions given in the text this utility function is
increasing, concave and has a positive third derivative (implying the existence of a
precautionary motive).  First differencing and using equation (5) we have:
lnCt+1 - lnCt  = ( t+1 -  t) +  f(Zt, µ(At+1,at+1)) +  t+1   (7)
                                                          
4 The utility function associated with this marginal utility function is:
 /(C) = -C*(lnC - 1 - ￿ - ￿)8
In this equation the first term ( t+1 -  t) captures the effects of the real interest rate, discount
rates and changes in the factors that affect preferences. For example, since the agent is
employed in period t and unemployed in period t+1 one element of this term allows for the
cost of going to work which has a negative impact on desired consumption growth. Since
there is no variation in this in our data this is absorbed into any constant in f(.). Before
discussing the parameterisation of f(.) we need to take account of two other important features
of the environment.
The first issue is that most of our sample of unemployed persons (hereinafter,
'respondents') live with other people. The impact of the job separation on household
consumption depends on what proportion of pre-separation household income was from the
respondent's earnings. Fairly obviously, if the job lost only accounted for a small fraction of
household income we should not expect much of an impact, whatever the replacement ratio.
The actual replacement rate we defined above (at+1) must be modified to take this into
account. From the data we can construct the ratio of the respondent's pre-separation earnings
to pre-separation household income, call this the 'importance of the respondent's earnings'.
Then define an 'importance adjusted replacement ratio',  ', by:
' = ( at+1-1) *(importance of the respondent's earnings)  (8)
This variable is always negative and is close to zero if the replacement ratio is close to unity
or if the respondent's pre-separation earnings were relatively unimportant for the household. It
is bounded below by minus unity which represents the case where the respondent's earnings
was the only source of income and this is not replaced at all.
The second feature that we must take account of is that the effects of changing the
benefit may be heterogeneous. We have already discussed the case of being liquidity
constrained, but there may also be other observable modifiers of the benefit effect. For
example, in Canada there is a Social Assistance (or 'welfare') scheme which provides a
transfer to households that have low income.
5  For households in receipt of Social Assistance,
as UI benefits fall, so Social Assistance benefits rise on a one-for-one basis.  Thus, a
                                                          
5 In Canada all low income households are eligible for Social Assistance irrespective of the composition of the household.
Thus a large proportion of the Social Assistance case load is single people with no dependents.9
reduction in UI benefits for those who receive Social Assistance will have no effect on
current income and we should not observe any benefit effect for the poorest households. It
may also be that the labour force status of the respondent's spouse (if married) will modify the
effects of the benefit. We denote the variables that are potential (observable) modifiers of the
benefit effect by X, where this may include indicators of being liquidity constrained, being
eligible for Social Assistance, having an employed spouse and interactions between these
variables; more details are given in the empirical section below
Adopting a linear form for f() and µ() we have the following version of equation (7):
lnCt+1 - lnCt  =  Zt' + '*X' +  t+1   (9)
In our empirical work the variables in X are a subset of the controls Z, so that in every case
the specification contains levels of these variables as well as their interaction with the benefit
variable. The parameters  capture the effects of the adjusted replacement ratio on
consumption changes for the different groups in X.
3. Data and Institutional Environment
The empirical results reported in this paper are based on several legislative changes to the
Canadian UI system, and a new panel data set which was created to study those changes.
Before April 1993 workers who had a minimum number of weeks of work in the year before
a job separation were entitled to UI benefits for a period that could be as long as one year.
The exact number of weeks to qualify for UI and the weeks of entitlement depended on the
local unemployment rate and ranged from 10 to 20 weeks of work to qualify and between 30
and 52 weeks of entitlement. The benefit paid was 60% of pre-separation earnings up to a
maximum insurable earnings of $745 per week (for a maximum benefit of $447 per week.)
6
All those who had a job separation and who met the entitlement qualification were eligible for
UI but 'quitters' were penalized by a 7 to 12 week waiting period. In April 1993 a series of
changes were made to this system. The most important was a reduction in the replacement
ratio from 60% to 57% (with a commensurate reduction in the maximum benefit to $425) and
                                                          
6 To convert (approximately) to U.S. or Euros, divide by 1.3.10
the disentitlement of 'quitters'. A second set of changes came into effect in April and July of
1994.  First, the statutory rate was further reduced from 57% to 55%.  Second, the minimum
number of weeks worked in the previous year increased from 10 to 12 weeks in high
unemployment regions. Third, the duration of benefits was decreased for any given number of
weeks of work in the year prior to the job loss.  Finally, individuals with dependents and
incomes below $340 per week would receive a 60% statutory replacement rate.
To evaluate the impact of the 1993 changes, a survey of about 11,000 people who had
a job separation in February and May of 1993 was conducted by Human Resources
Development Canada (HRDC). This survey is known as the Canadian Out of Employment
Panel (COEP). Each respondent was interviewed three times, at about 26, 39 and 60 weeks
after the job separation. Each interview was conducted over the telephone and took an
average of 25 minutes. Although it would have been desirable to have the first interview at a
date closer to the job separation this was not possible since the administrative records that
form the sampling frame do not become available until some months after the job separation.
This long interval between the job separation and the first interview is the price we have to
pay if we wish to sample only those who started an unemployment spell. To evaluate the
impact of the 1994 changes, HRDC then commissioned a second survey of about 8,000
individuals who separated from a job in February and May of 1995. The survey instrument
was refined (and slightly expanded) for this second survey but care was taken to insure
backwards comparability. In addition, the third interview was dropped.
To construct the sample used in this paper we began by restricting attention to
respondents between the ages of 20 and 60 who lost their job either because of a 'shortage of
work' ('laid of') or because they quit (other than to take another job) or were 'dismissed with
cause’. The main exclusions here are those who left due to illness and those on maternity
leave. We also excluded unmarried respondents living with a parent or with unrelated adults.
Preliminary analysis indicated that the quality of the responses to the household income and
expenditure questions was very poor among these individuals. From the remaining
observations we identified a sample of 5,318 respondents who were unemployed at the first
interview. We next selected those still in the first spell of unemployment; this left 3,32711
respondents. Thus all those in our sample have been continuously unemployed for about half
a year. We then dropped 487 respondents for whom the change in expenditure information
was missing. Then we excluded those who had changes in total expenditure that indicated that
their current total expenditure was more than double or less than one half of their previous
total expenditure. This left a sub-sample of 2,617 people. Even for this group some variables
are missing so that the final sample size is 1,805 respondents.
In this paper we use only information from the first interview of the COEP. In this
first wave a wide range of questions were asked including questions on the pre-separation
job; labor market activity in the period between the job separation and the interview; job
search details; the activities of other household members; income; expenditure and assets. To
the survey data we are able to match several kinds of administrative data for each respondent
(and their spouses) covering up to 5 years prior to the survey year.
For the purposes of this paper the most important set of variables are those concerning
expenditures. Two sets of questions were asked. The first was a set of levels questions
concerning expenditures in the week or month preceding the interview. Information on
housing; food at home; food outside the home; clothing and total expenditures was collected.
In addition, respondents were questioned about the change in monthly total expenditure from
before the job separation to the first interview.  From the data on the levels and change in
total monthly expenditures, we construct a variable that gives the proportional change in total














Note that this is slightly different from the usual construction in that we divide by the
(observed) current level, rather than the lagged (unobserved) level. This is the 'left hand side'
variable of this paper.
7 Among our sample of unemployed respondents the mean consumption
fall (as defined above) was 14%. Some 10% of the sample reported falls of 50% or more,
while more than a quarter reported no change or consumption growth.
                                                          
7 Unfortunately, we cannot construct a similar variable for particular categories of expenditure because the relevant
“change” information was not collected.12
The benefit variable we use is the 'importance adjusted replacement ratio' variable
defined in equation (8). The replacement ratio used to calculate this quantity is the ratio of UI
benefits currently received relative to the self-reported net-of-tax earnings on the lost job. The
UI benefit is derived from administrative records and is believed to be very accurate. Since
UI benefits are taxable it is adjusted to a net figure using the respondent's average UI tax rate
for the survey year. The self-reported earnings figure is subject to noise, both because of
reporting errors and because the reporting period (hourly, weekly etc.) is not completely clear
in every case.
8 The distribution of the replacement ratio is bi-modal with modes at zero (with
22% having no benefit) and at the administrative value of about 60%. The mean is 0.48 and
the interquartile range 0.36 to 0.68.  For those above the maximum insurable earnings, the
actual replacement rate will of course be less than the statutory rate. The actual replacement
ratio can exceed the statutory rate if workers earn less per week in the period just before the
job separation (to which the earnings question refers) than the average in the 20 weeks before
the job loss that are used to calculate the administrative entitlement. Differential tax treatment
of benefits and income can also lead to an actual replacement rate which exceeds the statutory
value.  Our measure of ‘importance’ has a mean of 0.47 and an inter-quartile range of 0.24 to
0.74.
Together, the 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys capture substantial legislative variation in
the parameters of the Canadian UI system. In addition, there was some administrative
variation in the system during the time period captured by the data.  In particular, the
maximum level of insurable earnings was increased annually by a formula that substantially
outpaced inflation. For individuals above the maximum insurable earnings, these increases
more than offset the cuts to the statutory replacement rate so that the real value of benefits
increased for high wage workers.  The period of 1993 to 1995 was one of slowly improving
labor market conditions in Canada (for example, the aggregate unemployment rate fell from
11.2 to 9.5%). Against this background our data capture changes in the UI system that for
some individuals increased its generosity (the increase in the maximum insurable earnings
                                                          
8 We cannot use the administrative record of earnings (which is presumably more accurate) since it is capped at the
maximum insurable earnings.13
and the introduction of the ‘dependents’ rate) while for other individuals the program became
less generous (the cuts to the standard statutory rate, the disentitlement of quitters, the
decreased weeks of benefit for weeks of work and the increased in the weeks of work
required to qualify for benefits.)
In addition to the expenditure and benefit variables, we also employ extensive controls
for the permanent shock of job loss, demographics and other determinants of expenditures.
These controls are based on both the COEP survey responses and administrative data and are
detailed in Appendix A.
4. Results
We now turn to our empirical results. We begin by estimating average responses of the
expenditure change to the replacement rate for our entire sample. This provides a base case
and is comparable to the equation estimated by Gruber (1997).
  In column 1 of Table 1 we present OLS estimates from the regression of the
proportional change in expenditures on our 'permanent' controls and the adjusted replacement
ratio; only the latter is reported in the Table. The controls include demographics, household
type, regional and seasonal variation, non-wage characteristics of the job that ended,
measures of the household’s financial resources prior to the job loss, the importance of the
respondent's earnings for pre-separation household income and polynomials in the logarithm
of monthly earnings in the lost job and the log of monthly total earnings in previous years
(see Appendix A for a complete listing of these variables). The coefficient estimate in column
1 of Table 1 would indicate that for a household in which the respondent's earnings were the
only source of income ('importance' = 1) a change in the replacement ratio from 60%, to 50%
would lead to a 0.8% fall in expenditures.
9  Since a cut in the replacement rate from 60% to
50% represents a cut in the benefit paid of 17% this gives an elasticity of expenditure with
respect to the benefit of (0.8/17)= 0.05. This is a very small effect. However, this is a mean
                                                          
9 The cofficient is 7.82 and for a  household in which the respondent's earnings were the only source of income ('importance'
= 1) this change in the replacement ratio changes the importance adjusted replacement rate by 0.1.14
effect and for all the reasons discussed in the theory section we might expect the effect to be
heterogeneous. Before turning to that issue we consider issues of endogeneity and sample
selection.
The validity of our interpretation of the coefficients on the benefit variables rests on
the latter reflecting only transitory changes and being uncorrelated with the permanent shock
of job loss. Furthermore, our sample is selected on having a unemployment spell of at least 6
months. We have controlled for various correlates of the permanent shock associated with a
job loss, such as being a seasonal worker or having high income. In addition to absorbing the
permanent shock, this rich set of covariates should also control for many of the differences
between our selected sample and separations as a whole.
Our first specification test is very similar in spirit to identification in a “regression
discontinuity” design (Angrist and Krueger, 1998).  We augment our base specification with a
variable that is the 'importance' variable multiplied by a dummy variable for having no UI
benefit. This variable captures a discontinuity at zero.  The ‘transitory’ income effects of
varying the replacement rate should be continuous but a discontinuity at zero might be
generated by ‘permanent income’ effects. To see why, note that those with a positive benefit
but a low replacement ratio had high earnings and hence a big permanent shock of job loss.
Those with no benefit almost all have less than the required weeks of prior work to qualify for
benefits. Consequently they have low attachment to the work force and the job loss represents
a relatively smaller permanent shock. The significance of the 'no benefit' variable thus
provides a first check on whether we have controlled adequately for the permanent shock.
The coefficient on this 'no benefit' variable is insignificant ( a t-value of 0.042) which
indicates that we are identifying a genuine transitory benefit effect with the continuous
replacement rate variable.
Our second test is a variant of the familiar Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, and tests the
adequacy of our controls both with respect to exogeneity of the benefit variables and with
respect to sample selection. We first estimated auxiliary regressions for the benefit variable
and for selection into our sample. Our two auxiliary equations are identified by two
instruments. The first is the statutory replacement rate, which takes on values 0.6, 0.57, 0.5515
and 0 (for the ineligible). The variation in this variable is driven entirely by the legislative
reforms captured by our data (including changes in eligibility requirements).  Our second
instrument is the weeks elapsed between the separation and the interview date. This varies
between 15 and 45 weeks, (with 90% between 24 and 40 weeks) due to the time required to
conduct a survey of this size. Under the null of full smoothing, and assuming that the
permanent shock of the unemployment spell is fully revealed in the first 15 weeks, this
variable can be excluded from the expenditure change regression. Our instruments are
significant in both auxiliary equations, even conditional on our full set of covariates. We then
added the residuals from these auxiliary regressions into our basic specification for the
proportional change in total expenditure. Tests for the significance of these residuals are tests
for the endogeneity of the benefit variable and sample selectivity. In neither case was the
exclusion rejected by the data. We take this to indicate that our rich set of covariates
adequately control both for the potential correlation of benefits with the permanent shock of
job loss and for sample selection.
10
To investigate heterogeneity in benefit responses we crossed the adjusted replacement
rate with a number of indicators, as discussed in section 3. As possible predictors of liquidity
constraints we considered having assets at the separation date,
11 age, being a regular UI use,
being a renter (versus being a home owner), being singles and having a spouse who was not
employed at the separation date. The latter captures the idea that in households where the
spouse was employed, it is likely that the household could borrow against the spouse's
income. We also included an indicator of whether the household was eligible for Social
Assistance since, as discussed above, such households are unlikely to respond to changes in
the replacement rate. The level of Social Assistance that a household is eligible for depends
on the household composition and the province of residence. From the latter and Social
Assistance administrative records we can determine the level of potential support for each
household in our sample. We then construct a 'not eligible for Social Assistance' dummy that
                                                          
10Full results from both exogeneity tests are available from the authors.
11In fact, we use a dummy for reporting no investment income in the previous year. The 1995 COEP contains a question
about liquid assets prior to the job loss, but the 1993 data does not. An analysis of 1995 data indicates that investment
income in the previous year is a very good predictor of having at least 2 months of earnings in liquid assets (the 'Zeldes
measure') at the job loss.16
equals unity if the household's self-reported net income is above the Social Assistance level.
12
We conducted an extensive specification search (not reported here) which considered all
these variables and 'crosses' of many of them. It should be noted that as our final specification
is the outcome of this specification search, the t-values are certainly overstated. Our search
lead us to include indicators for just two (non-exclusive) groups: respondents with no assets
at the separation date and respondents who were not eligible for Social Assistance (because
they had high income) and had a spouse who was not employed at the separation date.
In column 2 of Table 2 we present the results for the specification outlined in the
previous paragraph.
13 The important thing to note about this specification is that the
coefficient on the adjusted replacement rate (the 'mean' effect) is insignificant (and of the
'wrong' sign); consequently we exclude this variable and report our preferred specification in
column 3.  As can seen, the estimated benefit effects are statistically significant and
considerably larger than any others we found. The largest predicted benefit effect is thus for
households in the intersection of these two groups - which comprises just over 9% of our
sample.
14  Once again we consider the case where the respondent is the sole bread-winner
('importance' = 1) and a cut in the replacement rate from 60% to 50% (which constitutes a cut
of 17% in the actual benefit paid).  The predicted fall in total expenditures is 2.9%, with an
associated elasticity of 0.17.  Evaluated at the means (for households in the intersection of
these two groups), this would be a monthly cut in benefits of about $180 and in total
expenditures of about $45. Even for these households, our estimates do not imply dollar-for-
dollar cuts in expenditures with cuts to benefits.
We now present some variants on our preferred specification to check whether the
results are sensitive to changes in some of the modeling choices. The results are summarized
in Table 2. For convenience, the first row presents the preferred estimates from the final
column in Table 1. Here we also check the sensitivity of the parameters of interest to changes
in the sample using DFBETA statistics (see Chaterjee and Hadi (1988), for example). These
                                                          
12There is also an asset disqualification rule in most provinces. We have not built this into our eligibility variable.
13Only the coefficients on the benefit variables are reported in Table 2; the rest of the coefficient estimates for this
specification are presented in the last column of Table A1.
14In our working sample of 1805 households we have that 67% had no assets and 14% were in the second group of married
respondents with a non-employed spouse who were not eligible for Social Assistance.17
statistics are computed for each observation; they show by how much the parameter in
question is 'influenced' by the observation. Thus a large negative value means that if this
observation is removed then the parameter value would be become more positive. Similarly, a
value close to zero indicates that this observation could be removed without changing the
coefficient value. The second row of Table 2 indicates that the largest (in absolute value)
DFBETA statistics for the coefficients on the  replacement ratio variables is less than 0.4.
Thus we conclude that our results are not being driven by a small number of outliers.
15
We turn now to a number of restrictions on the estimating sample. The first
experiment concentrates on the 'importance' variable. It is motivated by the fact that for many
of the respondents the 'importance' variable is greater than unity. Unless the household had
negative net income for other sources of income than the respondent's earnings (which is
possible) then this must be because of the measurement error in the lagged net income and
earnings variables that are used to construct the importance measure. We drop respondents
who had 'importance' greater than unity; as can be seen the parameter estimates are virtually
unchanged.
The next two experiments address concerns about the variation in the replacement
ratio. As can be seen from the statistics presented at the end of section 3, we have some
respondents with a replacement ratio above the statutory rate of around 60% and also a
number who do not receive benefit. As explained above, the former is partly the result of the
differential tax treatment of benefits and earnings, but in the case of very high replacement
rates it is likely a consequence of our measure of past earnings being different from 'insurable
earnings' and measured with error. To check whether this is biasing our results, we simply
exclude those with a replacement ratio of above unity. As the third row of Table 2 reports, the
results actually become slightly stronger.
The other concern about the replacement rate is that our results might be driven solely
by the variation between those who have no benefit and those who do. In experiment 4 we
                                                          
15A plot of the DFBETA statistics against the proportional change in total expenditure (not reported) further reveals that the
vast majority of observations have very little influence on the parameter estimate (this is typical of empirical work on
micro data); effectively the results are dominated by those with large negative falls in expenditure. Amongst these, it is , of
course, those who have the smallest replacement ratio who make the parameter estimate 'more positive' and conversely for
those with a high replacement ratio.18
present the parameter estimates for the sub-sample who have positive benefit (using the
'preferred' replacement rate). Here, we find that our results become stronger again. The “zero
benefit” group in our sample comprises both individuals who have exhausted their benefits
and those who do not take up benefits, including the ineligible. However, conditional on our
rich controls we find no difference between these groups. We interpret this strengthening of
the response when excluding “zeroes” as indicating a nonlinear “s-shaped” relationship
between benefit levels and expenditure changes. Certainly, as the replacement rate
approaches one the ‘transitory income’ effect must diminish - presumably to nothing at full
replacement. The strengthening of our results with the exclusion of high replacement rates in
experiment 2 is consistent with this.  It also seems plausible that cuts to very low replacement
rates are likely to have less effect.  If households’ expenditures have fallen to a subsistence
level, then they may access resources that they would otherwise be unable or unwilling to
utilize. For example, borrowing from family and close friends may be contingent on (no more
than)  subsistence level expenditures.  If mechanisms such as these do operate, then cuts in
the replacement rate from, for example, 10% to zero should be expected to have a smaller
impact on expenditures than cuts from 60 to 50%. Unfortunately, the distribution of replace-
ment rates in our sample is not sufficiently dispersed to allow nonparametric estimates of the
benefit response. We simply note that our (linear) estimates of the response should be
interpreted as applying in the neighborhood of  the mean replacement rate in the data (48%).
Next we consider quits.  The disentitlement of quitters in 1993 provides an additional
source of variation in benefits but to the extent that quits are more voluntary than other job
separations one might be concerned that their presence in the sample is endogenously
determined by their entitlement. However, as row 5 (experiment 4) of Table 2 illustrates,
excluding quits from our sample has a negligible impact on the results.
The next set of robustness checks are somewhat different. It is plausible that those
who are most sensitive to benefit variations are those who experience the largest fall in
expenditure. To check this, we ran three quantile regressions - for the median, first quartile
and first decile respectively. As can be seen from Table 3, expenditure for the three
percentiles fall by 3.1%, 25% and 50% respectively. The parameter estimates given speak for19
themselves. The effect of the benefit variables is insignificant for the median group whereas it
is much larger for those who experience a large fall. Indeed, taking the parameter estimate for
the first decile, (and again, assuming 'importance' equal to one and focusing on the
households in the intersection of our two “sensitive” groups) a reduction in the replacement
rate from 60% to 50% would increase the expenditure fall by almost 8 percentage points. Our
interpretation of these quantile regression results is that some agents are liquidity constrained;
they have large falls in expenditure and show a large sensitivity to benefit changes whereas
most other agents are not affected by marginal changes in the benefit level and have smaller
falls in expenditure.
16
The bottom line for these robustness checks is that the basic result (see specification 3
in Table 1) seems to be robust to many changes in the empirical specification. Our results are
not being driven by a small number of outliers and they seem to be robust to changes in the
specification of the importance variable and the replacement rate. On the other hand, there is
considerable evidence that the mean effect given seems to be the result of a large effect for a
few people rather than a smaller effect for everyone.
5. Discussion
In this paper we have used a survey of workers who separated from a job in early 1993 or
1995 to investigate the ‘consumption smoothing’ benefit of UI. This is not the only benefit
from UI but we focus on it because it is often cited as being the most important benefit of UI
programs. The consumption smoothing benefit accrues to liquidity constrained households
who cannot consume in a manner consistent with their expected future income (making due
allowance for prudence). The question of whether households are liquidity constrained has
been the central focus of a great number of studies over the past 15 years, but this debate has
been remarkably inconclusive.
17  Nevertheless, if any segment of the population is likely to be
liquidity constrained it is the unemployed. This is because current income is more likely to be
                                                          
16Note however, that the theory outlined in section 2 applies to the means.
17See Browning and Lusardi (1995) who list about 25 such studies.20
below ‘permanent’ income for this group, they have relatively little in the way of assets and
anecdotal evidence suggests that the first thing that many potential lenders consider is the
labour force status of the applicant. Thus, the role of UI benefits in consumption smoothing
remains an important empirical question.
Another reason for focusing on liquidity constraints and the ‘consumption smoothing’
benefits of UI is that a large component of the effect of UI benefits on job search,
unemployment spell duration and the quality of a new job may run through this channel.  In
the standard model of the duration effects of UI benefit, agents have a linear utility function
and are indifferent about the timing of consumption. Consequently they simply maximize the
present value of income. The presence of a UI benefit distorts search behaviour and causes
agents to search ‘too much’. In a search model with strictly convex preferences (and hence a
preference for ‘smooth’ consumption) these “lifetime budget constraint” considerations
would continue to operate but we conjecture that such effects may be small relative to
consumption timing effects among the liquidity constrained. The consumption smoothing
effect will be to induce constrained agents to stop search (and take a job) ‘too early’. We
emphasise that this is conjectural; although the results in Fleming (1978), Danforth(1979) and
Iaonnides (1981) are suggestive, a full characterization of this problem is the subject of
ongoing research.
More generally, we can trace the impact of UI benefits on household behaviour and
welfare through the chain: UI benefits  personal income  household income  household
expenditures  current household living standards  long run outcomes. In this paper (and in
Gruber (1997)) the focus is on the overall link from benefits to expenditures. The link
between this and living standards (the purchases of non-durables and services and the service
flow from durables and housing) is a complicated one. For example, the mean 14% fall in
expenditures seen in our sample could all be for durables, clothing and costs of working. If
small durables  and clothing depreciate only slowly, then households will maintain living
standards (or 'smooth consumption') even over a relatively long unemployment spell. In a
companion paper (Browning and Crossley (1999)) we develop the idea that agents have
access to 'internal capital markets' by postponing the purchase of durables during an21
unemployment spell. Although there is a welfare cost from not replacing a (functioning)
durable at the optimal time,
18 this is of second order importance. For example, the service
flow from an old undamaged winter coat is almost as great as that from a new one. If this is
the case, then large changes in durable expenditures may not be reflected in large changes in
service flows and hence welfare. Because most small durables are luxuries, this 'internal
capital markets' hypothesis has qualitative predictions that are similar to the standard
Marshallian predictions but the rationale of the two hypotheses are quite different.
Other links in the chain above have also been investigated. For example, the
relationship between personal income and household income which depends on the reaction
of the earnings of other household members (see, for example, Kell and Wright (1990),
Gruber and Cullen (1996) and Antecol and Crossley (1998)). In a recent study of the effects
of UI benefits on expenditures, Slesnick and Hamermesh (1995) present a more ambitious
study of the impact of having some benefit on household welfare levels. Although the
principal focus of the Slesnick and Hamermesh paper is on the latter link they also provide an
empirical analysis of some of the other links based on the US CEX from 1980 to 1992, albeit
without taking into account the link between the timing of durables purchases and household
utility that we believe to be important (see the discussion of (Browning and Crossley (1999)
above). The benefit variable used is receipt of UI benefits sometime in the previous 12
months. They conclude that “demographically identical households that receive benefits
achieve the same level of economic welfare as demographically identical households that do
not receive benefits''. Note, however, that 'UI recipient' households at the time of the survey
may not contain any unemployed members and 'non-UI' households may have unemployed
members who do not receive benefits.
 Our findings suggest a very modest and only marginally significant mean impact of
benefit levels on household expenditures. The marginal significance is consistent with the
Slesnick and Hamermesh finding. Our specific estimate suggests that a ten percentage point
cut in the benefit would result in an average fall of less than 1% in total expenditure. In work
similar to that reported here, Gruber (1997) uses the PSID to examine the impact of UI
                                                          
18That is, optimal for an agent who is not liquidity constrained.22
benefits on changes in expenditures on food at home and food outside the home. Gruber’s
estimates imply that a 10 % point cut in the UI replacement rate would lead to an average fall
of about 2.5% in food expenditures. The interpretation of Gruber’s results - and the
comparison of those with the results reported here - depends heavily on the relationship
between changes in food expenditure and changes in total expenditure during an unemploy-
ment spell. Gruber states that the response of food and total expenditure should be the same
but it is difficult to see why. In a standard Marshallian model, the income elasticities for food
at home and food outside are about 0.4 and 1.2 respectively. Given a budget share for food at
home that is about three times the budget share for food outside, we have an elasticity of abut
0.6 for the composite food commodity. Thus the Gruber results suggest a change of 4%
(=2.5%/0.6) for total expenditure which is a good deal higher than our mean effect
19.
As discussed in Browning and Crossley (1999), there is reason to believe, however,
that standard Marshallian demand analysis may not be appropriate for the unemployed. The
‘internal capital markets’ hypothesis suggests that the responses of expenditure on durables to
an income loss because of unemployment will be larger than implied by income elasticities
estimated on samples of households experiencing ‘normal times’. In Browning and Crossley
(1999) we present strong evidence for this contention. This further suggests that changes in
food expenditure may be an even smaller fraction of changes in total expenditure than typical
food-income elasticities would suggest. Thus all these considerations would suggest that
Gruber’s implied estimate of the mean benefit for total expenditure is a good deal higher than
ours.
Our analysis of the mean effect differs from Gruber’s study in several respects. The
most obvious of these is that Gruber uses US data and we use Canadian data. One immediate
corollary of this is that we are generally dealing with UI benefit replacement rates that are
higher than those for the US. The timing is also different; Gruber uses year to year variations
in employment status and does not control for how long the unemployment spell is whereas
most of our sample have had a spell of between four and nine months. We also employ a
                                                          
19Hamermesh (1982) reports standard Marshallian estimates of the impact of an unemployment spell on the structure of
demands.23
different source of variation in UI benefits to identify the transitory response. Gruber uses
state level provisions which vary over both time and across states. In Canada, UI benefits are
set nationally, and vary only through time. However, our data capture two major sets of
legislative changes to the Canadian UI system, as well as some administrative changes. While
not as extensive as the variation captured by Gruber’s data, the variation in the Canadian
program parameters is substantial and transparent. One concern with Gruber’s approach is
that it identifies the (temporary) 'benefit' effect only if state level variables are uncorrelated
with permanent shocks from a job separation. For example, if states have to balance their UI
accounts then benefit levels will be lower the worse is the unemployment situation. If the
latter is also correlated with a larger negative shock from a job loss then part of the effect in
Gruber’s base estimates could be due to the negative correlation between benefit levels and
the permanent shock. If in a regression of expenditure changes on benefit levels there is a
positive coefficient on the latter then this may be partly due to the direct benefit effect (due to
liquidity constraints) and partly due to the negative correlation between job separation shocks
and expenditure changes. However, Gruber’s results seem robust to attempts to deal with this
issue, including conditioning on state fixed effects.
It is also possible that the differences in our results arise because of differences in the
population of unemployed between Canada and the US, or in differences in the smoothing
mechanisms available to the unemployed in the two countries. Given the expenditures on
unemployment insurance in western economies, and the relative lack of empirical research on
the benefits of unemployment insurance, estimates on various samples and using alternative
sources of variation in benefit levels would seem important.
Although we find only a small mean effect, our most important finding is that the
benefit effect is very heterogeneous. Most unemployed households seem to be insensitive to
marginal changes in the level of benefit. The results presented in Table 1 (and the
specification checks presented in Section 4) suggest that there are substantial effects for some
households that did not have liquid assets at the job separation and/or in which there is a24
spouse who is not employed. The quantile regressions presented in Table 2 point even more
clearly toward the conclusion that benefit effects are concentrated on a small proportion of
our sample (about 10%) but for them there is close to a one-one relationship between UI
benefit levels and total expenditure (as theoretical models of liquidity constraints would
suggest). Moreover, these same households are the ones which have had to cut expenditure
the most. This finding of considerable heterogeneity suggests that conclusions drawn from
studies that use a representative agent framework may be misleading.
Gruber combines his estimates with the framework of Baily (1978) to calculate
optimal levels of UI provision under alternative assumptions about risk aversion.  We have
not pursued such a calculation here for two reasons. First, Baily’s framework does not
accommodate the type of heterogeneity we find strong evidence for. If the benefits of
unemployment insurance differ across households then the social benefit of the program
depends on the weights society attaches to different households. Second, in Baily’s
framework agents face a risk of unemployment in the second period of a two period life.
Whether they are unemployed for part of that period or not, they are free to reallocate
resources within the period - from times of employment to unemployment, for example.
There are no liquidity constraints and no benefits of the ‘consumption smoothing’ type in the
model. The benefits of UI in the Baily model are those from the ‘insurance’ and ‘risk pooling’
effects outlined in the introduction. The ‘insurance’ benefits are likely unrealistically large
because of the small number of periods (a point that Baily acknowledges in his discussion of
Fleming’s extension of his model to many periods). Estimates of the ‘consumption
smoothing’ benefits of UI are therefore not informative about magnitudes in the Baily model.
To conclude, we have used a survey of unemployed Canadian workers to investigate
the effects of changes in the UI benefit on household total expenditure. We emphasise that we
consider only medium length unemployment spells (between four and nine months); we have
no estimates of the effect of benefit levels on short run or long run expenditures. Moreover,
our results are best applied to UI systems that have replacement ratios of between 40% and
60%; we would not want to extrapolate to what would happen if benefits were cut or25
increased dramatically. Given this, some clear results do emerge. The most important of these
is that for most households in our sample (perhaps as much as 90%) small changes in UI
benefits would not lead to changes in total expenditure. For a small number of households,
however, total expenditure is very sensitive to the level of UI benefits. These households are
those that had little in the way of assets or access to credit and which experienced a large fall
in total expenditure. Although the implications for policy from this finding have yet to be
fully analysed it is clear that the consumption smoothing gain from UI (which many believe
to be the most important gain) will depend heavily on the weight given to the small group
who have substantial welfare gains from increases in UI benefits.26
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Implied % change in total expenditure
from a 10 point cut in the replacement
rate for importance = 1
-0.8% -2.9% -2.9%
  Estimated equations are of the form:
  lnCt+1 - lnCt  =  Zt' + '*X' +  t+1
  where ' is the importance adjusted replacement rate, X are modifiers of the benefit
effect, and Z are controls for the demographic determinants of expenditure and for
the ‘permanent’ shock of job loss. The controls in Z include: demographics,
household type, regional and seasonal variation, non-wage job characteristics,
financial resources prior to the job loss, a polynomial in ln(earnings in the lost job),
ln(earnings in from previous years). Full results available from the authors.28
TABLE 2: Regressions - Robustness Checks




















































Alternate estimates of the preferred specification (specification 3 in Table 1).  Rows 1
through 4 differ in the estimating sample.  Rows 5 through 7 report quantile, rather than
least squares regressions. Because of the well known problems with asymptotic standard
errors for quantile regression, we report bootstrap standard errors based on 100 replications.29
Appendix A
Table A1 provides additional information on our controls for the permanent shock of job loss, demographics and
other determinants of expenditure. Column 1 list these variables. Column 2 gives their mean in our sample, and
column three provides some further information. The final column presents the estimate coefficient (and related
t-statistic) for each variable in our preferred specification (the coefficients on benefit variables in this
specification were presented in column 3 of Table 1.)
TABLE A1: Controls - means, notes and coefficients from preferred specification
Variable Mean Notes coef. [t-stat]
Constant -3.940  [-.9]









Age -0.23 decades from 40  2.170  [3.31]
Ln(household size)  0.94 -1.380  [-.73]
Male  0.48 dummy -0.010  [-.01]






dummies; married, spouse employed
at job loss is the omitted category











dummies; Ontario is the omitted
category
 7.290  [3.36]
 0.860  [.56]
 2.280  [1.24]
-0.610  [-.3]
Assets at Job Loss  0.33 dummy; investment income in
previous tax year
-3.340  [-1.68]
Home owner  0.58 dummy 3.210  [2.35]
% of household income committed  0.30 (mortgage payment or rent)/
household income at interview
8.730  [3.39]
Eligible for Social Assistance  0.26 dummy -1.690  [-.9]
Expected job loss  0.56 dummy 1.240  [1.01]
Seasonal job  0.16 dummy 1.290  [.74]





dummy; white collar, non-manager
is the omitted category
-2.200  [-1.45]
 1.340  [.87]
UI use in 1 of 2 previous yrs  0.59 dummy 1.530  [1.17]
Weeks work in year before job loss  30.6 -0.090  [-2.1]
Local unemployment rate  0.11 16.620 [.99]
Ln(earnings last year)
Ln(earnings 2 yrs previous)
 1.05
 0.97
$1000s/month -0.040  [-.03]
-2.490  [-1.84]
Ln(earnings on lost job)
squared
cubed
0.43 $1000/month  0.770  [.34]
-0.120  [-.1]
-0.500  [-.64]
Notes: Means are for the estimation sample of 1805 observations. Coefficients and t- statistics are for the preferred
specification (specification 3, Table 1). Coefficients on benefit variables are reported in Table 1.30